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Abstract
The precautionary principle has been proposed as a basis making decisions about 
environmental  health  under  conditions  of  uncertainty,  but  remains 
controversial.  This  paper  shows  how  the  precautionary  principle  may  be 
interpreted as a guide to decisionmaking in complex systems characterised by 
unfavorable  surprises.  The  application  of  the  precautionary  principle  to  the 
problem of climate change is discussed. Introduction
There  is  widespread  consensus,  summarised  in  the  reports  of  the 
Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  (2007a,b,c),  that  in  the 
absence  of  mitigation  policies,  average  global  temperatures  will  rise 
substantially  over  the  next  century,  with  ‘business  as  usual  projections’  of 
temperature  increases  ranging  from  2  to  5  degrees  Celsius.  This  increase  in 
temperature will be associated with complex effects on other aspects of climate, 
such as rainfall patterns and the frequency and intensity of storms, and with 
consequent effects on natural ecosystems and human activity.
As this very brief summary indicates, the problem of climate change is complex 
and  subject  to  considerable  uncertainty.  Policy  responses  to  such  complex 
problems  have  proved  difficult  to  formulate.  Even  greater  difficulty  has  been 
found  in  securing  agreement  on  which  of  many  possible  policy  responses  to 
pursue.
One  response  to  these  difficulties,  particularly  in  relation  to  threats  to 
environmental  health  has  been  the  precautionary  principle.  Many  variants  of 
this principle have been put forward and debated. One of the most commonly 
cited is  derived from from the Wingspread Conference (1998): 
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or 
the  environment,  precautionary  measures  should  be  taken 
even  if  some  cause  and  effect  relationships  are  not  fully 
established scientifically.
Although a range of different interpretations of this statement are possible, most 
reasonable  interpretations  would  imply  support  for  action  to  mitigate  climate 
change  by  reducing  or  offsetting  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases.  Hence, 
acceptance of the precautionary principle as a guide to responses to complex and uncertain environmental health problems would provide a clear basis for action. 
However,  many  critics  have  argued  that  the  precautionary  principle  is  an 
unsatisfactory  basis  for  decisionmaking  either  because  it  may  be  applied  to 
prevent  any  action  (in  strong  versions)  or  because  it  lacks  any  substantive 
content beyond standard rules of decision analysis (in weak versions).
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the precautionary principle and show how 
it is applicable to complex and uncertain problems such as climate change. The 
paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  1  presents  background  material  on  the 
problem of climate change. Section 2 considers objective and subjective views of 
the global climate change problem as a complex system. Section 3 shows how the 
precautionary  principle  may  be  interpreted  as  a  guide  to  decisionmaking  in 
complex systems characterised by unfavorable surprises. Section 4 discusses the 
application  of  the  precautionary  principle  to  the  problem  of  climate  change. 
Finally, some concluding comments are offered.
1. Background
Before considering the role of complexity, it is useful to summarise key aspects of 
climate change, as described by the IPCC( 2007a,b,c), on which this section is 
based. Some aspects of the problem are well understood, and others much less 
so. 
The  physical  reasoning  underlying  the  greenhouse  effect  is  scientifically 
uncontroversial and dates back to the 19th century. Greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide and water vapour reduce the extent to which heat energy in the 
atmosphere,  derived  from  solar  radiation,  is  radiated  back  out  into  space. 
Increases in concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) may be expected to raise the 
equilibrium temperature of the earth’s atmosphere. Climate models indicate that 
this effect will be amplified by positive feedbacks, most notably an increase in 
atmospheric concentrations of water vapour.The growth of atmospheric concentrations of the main greenhouse gas, carbon 
dioxide has been tracked at Mauna Loa, Hawaii since 1957. CO2 has increased 
from about 313 ppm (parts per million) in 1960 to about 375 ppm in 2005. This 
increase  is  entirely  accounted  for  by  human  activity,  most  importantly  the 
burning of fossil fuels and the clearing of forests. Anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
have been partially offset by natural sinks, such as absorption by the oceans. In 
addition  to  CO2,  human  activity  has  also  generated  increased  atmospheric 
concentrations  of  other  greenhouse  gases,  including  methane  and 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
Global temperatures have risen by about 0.75 degrees C relative to the period 
1860-1900,  with  about  0.5  degrees  of  this  increase  occurring  since  1970. 
Temperature changes reflect a combination of natural variation and the effects 
of anthropogenic global warming. The IPCC states that ‘Most of the observed 
increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very 
likely  due  to  the  observed  increase  in  anthropogenic  greenhouse  gas 
concentrations’, where ‘very likely’ is explained as a probability between 90 and 
95 per cent.
IPCC  (2007a,b)  presents  a  range  of  model-based  forecasts  of  future  climate 
change.  The  key  variables  are  the  projected  time  path  of  emissions  and  the 
sensitivity  of  the  climate  system  to  ‘forcing’,  conventionally  measured  as  the 
equilibrium  response  of  global  mean  temperatures  to  a  doubling  of  CO2 
equivalent concentrations. 
Median values for the projected temperature increase by 2100 range from 2.5 
degrees  to  4  degrees  C  depending  on  the  choice  of  model  and  scenario.  Each 
projection includes a probability distribution giving a range of uncertainty. For 
typical projections the standard deviation of the projected temperature change is 
around 1 degree C.Ideologically-motivated ‘skepticism’
The  problems  of  climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation  have  been 
exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  many  of  the  proposed  mitigation  policies  are 
politically controversial. Opponents of those policies have responded by rejecting 
the scientific evidence and by attacking scientific organisations and individual 
scientists. Calling themselves ‘skeptics’, critics have attacked every aspect of the 
mainstream  analysis  from  data  on  CO2  concentrations,  to  the  historical 
temperature record, to projections of future climate change and its impacts.With 
a  handful  of  exceptions,  those  making  these  attacks  are  not  active  climate 
scientists. Among that handful, nearly all have financial ties to the fossil fuel 
industries, ideological associations with anti-environmental thinktanks or both.
As regards the concerns of this paper, the fact that a large group of participants 
in public debate is actively seeking to increase, rather than reduce, uncertainty 
about all aspects of the problem raises some important difficulties. However, as 
will  be  shown  below,  uncertainty  about  the  problem  does  not  necessarily 
strengthen the case for inaction.
2. A complex system
It is apparent that the combination of human activities and natural processes 
that produces climate change is a highly complicated process, and that a wide 
variety  of  interactions  take  place  between  socioeconomic,  biological  and 
atmospheric  systems  to  produce  outcomes  that  are  subject  to  a  great  deal  of 
uncertainty. Hence, it is natural to speak of a complex system. 
However, without a clear understanding of what is implied, the use of ‘complex 
systems’ terminology may conceal as much as it reveals. In the present case, it is 
useful to distinguish between objective properties of the system, and subjective 
aspects of our understanding of that system.
The objective viewFrom an objective viewpoint, the set of interactions involved in climate change 
has  many  of  the  characteristics  commonly  associated  with  complex  systems. 
First, important aspects of the system are highly nonlinear. 
Because of nonlinearity of the atmospheric system, daily weather patterns are 
impossible  to  predict  more  than  about  a  week  ahead,  even  with  powerful 
computers and extensive data. In highly nonlinear systems, slight variations in 
initial conditions lead to much larger deviations in equilibrium paths over time. 
The ‘butterfly effect’ in which a butterfly flapping its wings in one location might 
make the difference between the occurrence or non-occurrence of a cyclone in 
another location at a later date is a popular metaphor for the chaotic behaviour 
of such nonlinear systems.
In some cases, nonlinearities in the system may act to enhance stability. For 
example,  the  forcing  effect  of  CO2  is  not  linear  but  is  proportional  to  the 
logarithm of CO2 concentrations, so that the direct marginal impact of additional 
units of CO2 declines as the existing concentration increases. 
On  the  other  hand,  other  nonlinear  effects  generate  instability,  leading  to 
concerns  about  a  possible  runaway  greenhouse  effect,  as  has  taken  place  on 
Venus. Some of these nonlinearities arise from interactions within the climate 
system,  such  as  changes  in  the  dynamics  of  cloud  formation  and  in  the 
development of tropical cyclones.
Complex  nonlinear  effects  may  arise  from  interactions  between  climatic  and 
biological  systems.  For  examples,  increased  temperature  may  lead  to  more 
frequent and more severe bushfires which in turn produce massive emissions of 
CO2.
Nonlinear systems often display threshold effects, in which the system jumps 
from one mode of behaviour to another when some input exceeds a critical value. 
For  example,  CO2  emitted  from  human  activity  may  be  absorbed  by  natural sinks.  When  the  capacity  of  these  sinks  is  exhausted,  the  rate  of  growth  of 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 may increase sharply.
A threshold effect that has received significant attention is the possible sudden 
shutdown of the thermohaline circulation that drives ocean currents. Such an 
event could lead to cooling in the North Atlantic, which is currently warmed by 
the Gulf Stream.
An important characteristic of complex systems is that of emergent effects. Such 
effects arise when behaviour at some scale of aggregation, such as a national 
economy or a global climate system cannot be derived by modelling behaviour at 
a more disaggregated scale, such as that of individual industries or components 
of the climate system. Rather, the system as a whole has properties that cannot 
be deduced from the behaviour of its components.
Climate  change  is  a  phenomenon  that  takes  place  at  many  scales,  from  the 
atmosphere  as  a  whole  to  local  micro-climates  and  the  ecosystems  and 
socioeconomic systems they support. A wide range of emergent effects must be 
taken into account.
The subjective view
For policy purposes, the objective characteristics of a system are only indirectly 
relevant. What matters is the subjective representation of the system available 
to decisionmakers. It is this subjective representation that forms the basis of 
policy choices.
Objective  complexity  generally  implies  subjective  complexity,  but  this  is  not 
always the case. More importantly, limited understanding of the properties of a 
system lead to subjective complexity even in cases where the objective behaviour 
of the system is linear and deterministic. 
For example, the behaviour of the solar system may be explained and predicted 
(up  to  a  very  good  approximation)  using  Newtonian  physics.  However,  when understanding of the system was based on a heliocentric model of the universe 
with circular motion, observed behaviour could only be explained by a complex 
system of cycles and epicycles. 
In  the  case  of  climate  change,  the  objective  complexity  of  the  system  is 
exacerbated by our limited understanding of crucial natural, economic and social 
components of that system. This uncertainty arises at multiple levels.
First,  within  any  given  model,  parameters  are  uncertain.  In  typical  global 
climate  models,  for  example,  estimates  of  sensitivity  to  a  doubling  of  CO2 
concentrations  may  vary  in  a  range  of  2  degrees  or  more  depending  on 
assumptions about feedbacks and the values of other parameters (IPCC 2007a).
Second, there are multiple models which yield different projections, even with 
the  same  settings  for  standard  inputs  and  parameter  values.  Decisionmakers 
must consider whether to choose a particular model as their preferred tool for 
analysis or to integrate results from multiple models.
Third,  and  more  fundamentally,  there  may  be  surprises  not  yet  taken  into 
account  in  models,  which  may  generate  new  and  unexpected  feedbacks.  For 
example, climate models at present do not take into account the climatic impacts 
of more severe forest fires.
Even if the underlying behaviour of a system is linear and deterministic, the fact 
that  human  beings  are  boundedly  rational  creatures  means  that  our 
understanding is always limited. In attempting to understand any sufficiently 
complicated problem, whether or not the associated system is objectively complex 
in the sense described above, our analysis will inevitably omit important details.
3. The Precautionary Principle
Many versions of the precautionary principle have been put forward. As noted 
above, the definition put forward by the Wingspread Conference (1998) provides 
a useful basis for discussion. Critics such as Sunstein (2005) have pointed out that, taken literally, the precautionary principle is self-contradictory. All activity 
of any significance raises threats of harm to human health or the environment in 
one way or another. In particular, unnecessary precautions waste resources that 
could be used to promote health or the environment.
Moreover, the phrasing of the principle with reference to ‘an activity’ embodies 
the implicit assumption that there exists a status quo option in which no activity 
is undertaken. This assumption may be appropriate for some applications. In 
general, however, no such option exists, and it is necessary to choose between 
alternatives, all of which involve change and may potentially create risks. As the 
saying has it, ‘not to decide is to decide’.
However, it is possible to rationalise the precautionary principle as a guide to 
management  of  complex  systems.  Complete  understanding  of  such  systems  is 
unattainable.  However,  it  is  often  possible  to  distinguish  between  decisions 
where the consequences are understood fairly clearly, at least in a probabilistic 
sense,  and  those  that  are  likely  to  generate  unanticipated  possibilities  or 
surprises. 
In some systems, surprises may be favourable. In others, however, such as those 
typically involved in environmental health, most surprises are unfavorable. We 
may refer to a system involving a large number of unanticipated possibilities, 
most of which are likely to be unfavorable, as a domain of unfavorable surprises.
It  is  in  the  nature  of  complex  systems  that  the  statements  of  propensity  or 
likelihood  used  in  the  characterisation  of  a  domain  of  unfavorable  surprises 
cannot  usefully  be  expressed  in  probabilistic  terms,  and  are  therefore  not 
amenable  to  a  risk  analysis  using  the  tools  of  classical  or  Bayesian  decision 
theory.  However,  it  is  possible  to  derive  notions  of  reasonable  belief  that  are 
appropriate to problems of this kind (Halpern 2003, Grant and Quiggin 2006). 
Using these approaches, it is possible to integrate concepts such as ‘burden of 
proof’ into a decision-theoretic analysis.Hence, we proposed the following reformulation of the precautionary principle: 
Where a proposed course of action in the management of a 
complex system may lead to unfavorable surprises, such as 
threats to environmental health, the burden of proof should 
be on the proponents of the course of action to demonstrate 
reasonable grounds for belief that it will not be harmful.
This  reformulation  overcomes  objections  like  those  of  Sunstein  (2005)  by 
characterising activities and domains where the precautionary principle is, and 
is not, applicable. Moreover, it avoids the implicit assumption that there is a 
status quo option. 
Heuristics
The analysis of the precautionary principle presented here supports a range of 
heuristics  regarding  complex  choices  that  have  proved  useful  in  a  variety  of 
contexts.
  First,  it  is  desirable  before  making  a  decision  to  identify  areas  of  high 
uncertainty and reduce such uncertainty as much as possible. This is a generally 
accepted principle of risk analysis.
Second, it is important to avoid excessive reliance on point estimates of crucial 
parameters.  Although  some  sensitivity  analysis  is  commonly  undertaken  in 
benefit–cost analysis, evidence suggests that allowance for unexpected variations 
is  commonly  inadequate,  particularly  in  relation  to  large-scale  ‘megaprojects 
‘(Flyvbjerg, Bruzeliu and Rothengatter 2003).
Third,  it  is  important  to  place  an  appropriate  value  on  flexibility  and  on  the 
maintenance of a range of options. The relationship between option value and 
the  precautionary  principle  has  been  discussed  by  Gollier,  Jullien  and  Treich 
(2000).Finally, the precautionary principle gives some support to the use of rules of 
thumb  with  a  track  record  of  reliability,  even  where  a  formal  risk  analysis 
suggests  that  these  rules  of  thumb  may  be  overly  cautious.  The  case-based 
decision theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) provides a useful approach to 
the application of such rules.
4. Application to climate change
The formulation of the precautionary principle developed here applies naturally 
to climate change. Although there are a wide range of possible options, we may 
simplify here by considering two options. 
The  first,  ‘business  as  usual’  suggests  that  existing  economic  and  social 
arrangements should not be changed in response to the risk of climate change. If 
policies that reduce CO2 emissions, such as improvements in the fuel-efficiency 
of motor vehicles, are to be adopted, they should be justified on other grounds.
The second, ‘stabilisation’ involves stabilising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
equivalents  at  a  level  consistent  with  an  eventual  increase  in  global 
temperatures of no more than 2 degrees. Most current assessments suggest that 
the required stabilisation target is a concentration of between 500 and 550 ppm. 
The  implied  requirement  is  for  a  reduction  in  CO2  emissions  of  60  per  cent 
relative to business as usual.
In many contexts, ‘business as usual’ is taken to be the default option. In the 
case  of  climate  change,  however,  continuing  business  as  usual  involves  a 
cumulative  increase  in  atmospheric  CO2  concentrations  to  levels  well  beyond 
any in the range of human experience. The consequences of such an increase are 
inherently unpredictable. There are too many interactions and feedbacks to take 
them all into account, and some of them will undoubtedly involve unpleasant 
surprises. Perhaps the biggest single area of unpredictability relates to natural 
ecosystems. Given a substantial change in global temperatures, many species 
will undoubtedly become extinct. With an increase of only 1.5 degrees, as many as one-third of all species would be at risk of extinction (IPCC 2007c). With more 
rapid  increases,  a  mass  extinction  event  is  increasingly  likely.  The  full 
consequences of such an extinction event are beyond out capacity to predict, or 
even to consider.
By contrast, the consequences of a stabilisation policy are understood fairly well, 
by economists at least. The only feasible method of reducing CO2 emissions by 
the  amount  required  is  to  impose  a  price  on  such  emissions,  either  directly 
through  a  carbon  tax  or  indirectly  through  as  system  of  tradeable  emissions 
permits. Standard methods of economic analysis may be used to estimate the 
likely impacts of such a price change.
The crucial variables in assessing the impact of a price change for any good  are 
the  elasticity  (price-responsiveness)  of  demand  and  the  share  of  the  good  in 
economic  activity  as  a  whole.  Popular  discussion  tends  to  overestimate  the 
economic importance of carbon-based fuels and underestimate the elasticity of 
demand. In fact, carbon-based fuels account for around 5 per cent of economic 
output.  In  the  short  run,  demand  for  energy  is  inelastic.  However,  as  the 
experience of the 1970s showed, a sustained increase in energy prices produces 
large reductions in demand over periods of a decade or more (Quiggin 2006).
A number of independent estimates of the cost of a stabilization policy have been 
undertaken  by  economists  with  a  range  of  views  on  climate  policy.  All  such 
estimates imply a small reduction in the value of economic output, with most 
estimates lying in the range from 1 and 3 per cent. Although energy-intensive 
activities  will  contract  significantly,  this  will  be  offset  by  expansion  of  other 
parts  of  the  economy.  Application  of  the  precautionary  principle  therefore 
suggests that stabilisation is the appropriate policy response. 
A detailed analysis of the policy responses required for the implementation of a 
cost-effective and flexible stabilisation policy is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, there are strong arguments to suggest that Australia should abandon its opposition to the Kyoto protocol, and move rapidly towards the establishment 
of a system of emissions trading, beginning with major sources such as electricity 
and automotive emissions and moving towards a more comprehensive scheme 
over time (Gans and Quiggin 2007). We would then be in a position to participate 
in negotiations aimed at ensuring the active participation of developing countries 
such as India and China in a post-Kyoto agreement to begin in 2012.
Concluding comments
The precautionary principle is an important element of public policy in response 
to  threats  to  environmental  health,  such  as  climate  change.  However,  the 
principle remains controversial, and its implications in particular cases are not 
always clear.
In this paper, the precautionary principle has been reformulated with specific 
reference  to  complex  systems.  In  such  complex  systems,  the  complete 
examination of all possible outcomes presupposed in probabilistic approaches to 
risk analysis is not possible, and unforeseen outcomes (surprises) may occur. If a 
course  of  action  lead  to  domains  where  unfavorable  surprises  are  likely,  the 
burden of proof should be on the burden of proof should be on the proponents of 
the course of action to demonstrate reasonable grounds for belief that it will not 
be harmful.
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